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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DIVORCE.
Andrews v. Andrews,
x88 U. S. 14 (i9o3).-The latest development in the American divorce law is the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in upholding the constitutionality of the Massachusetts
Statute aimed at what are popularly called "Dakota Divorces."
On the surface, the decision of Andrews v. Andrews appears to
be a step in advance in divorce law, permitting one state to
protect itself from the loose laws of another state. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case. The law remains the
same as it was by the weight of state authority before the
declaration of the Supreme Court. The decision, however, may
be valuable in its tendency to bring the New York and the two
Carolina Courts into harmony with the other states on the
divorce question.
The facts of Andrews v. Andrews are briefly these: A and
B, citizens of Massachusetts domiciled in Boston, were mar-
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tied in that city in 1887 and continued to reside there after
their marriage. In 189i A went to South Dakota to secure
a divorce upon grounds not deemed adequate under the laws
of Massachusetts, remaining there a sufficient time to acquire a residence under the South Dakota law before filing
his petition for a divorce. The lower court found that he intended to return to Massachusetts, when the divorce was
granted, and that he had no other business in South Dakota
than the prosecution of the divorce; that he voted at an election in South Dakota and his intention was to become a resident for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, and to that end
became as a matter of law a resident there. A and B never
lived as husband and wife in South Dakota, but the wife appeared by counsel and a divorce was granted, the wife consenting to the divorce, upon an agreement being effected
between the parties. A then returned to Massachusetts, married C, and wa.s there domiciled until his death. Upon A's
death, both B and C sought the aid of the court, each asserting her right to administer the estate as A's lawful widow.
The Massachusetts Court held that the divorce obtained in
South Dakota was void under their statute-"A divorce decreed in another state or country according to the laws thereof
by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of both parties
shall be valid and effectual in this commonwealth; but if an
inhabitant of this commonwealth goes into another state or
country to obtain a divorce for a cause which occurred here,
while the parties resided here, or for a cause which would
not authorize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth, a
divorce so obtained shall be of no force or effect in this commonwealth." Sec. 352 Rev. Laws Mass. i9O2, ch. 152, p. 1357.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, the single question being the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute.
There were two objections urged against the act: first, that
the state had no power to legislate on the subject of divorce,
and, second, admitting such power to exist, this particular exercise was in direct violation of the "full faith and credit" clause
of the Constitution of the United States.
That the question of marriage and divorce is a subject of
state legislation is now undisputed. "Marriage," says justice Field in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 19o (1887), "as
creating the most important relation in life, as having more
to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any
other institution, has always been subject to the control of
the legislature. The body prescribes the age at which parties
may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects
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upon the property rights of both, present and prospective, and
the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution." The
argument which denies this right to the state assumes that
marriage is a civil contract and as such is under the protection
of the ioth section of Article I of the constitution, that "No
state shall .

. .

. pass any law impairing the obligation of con-

tracts." Although marriage is a contract, it is not such a
contract within the contemplation of this clause of the constitution, and the courts have held that whether the divorce be
granted by virtue of a general act of assembly or directly by
special dispensation of the legislature, the divorce is valid.
Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. 225 (1867) ; Maguire v. Maguire,
7 Dana i81 (1838) ; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss. 349 (1866);
Maynard v. Hill, supra.
"The clause in the constitution respecting the obligation
of contracts has never been underistood to restrict the general right of the legislature on the subject of divorces." Chief
Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat.
518 (1819) ; Adams v.Palmer, 51 Me.480 (1863).
Some of the courts, as in Clark v. Clark, Io N. H. 380
(1839), and Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1843), denied
the authority of the legislature to grant divorces by special
legislation, alleging that the granting of a divorce was a
judicial power and could not be exercised by the legislature,
but the Supreme Court in Maynard v. Hill,supra, declared that
divorces so granted were valid, though many of the states have
now by provisions of their constitutions prohibited such legislative divorces. In deciding in favor of the state's right to
legislate, Justice White in Andrews v. Andrews says, " The
statute was but the exercise of an essential attribute of government, to dispute the possession of which would be to deny the
authority of the state of Massachusetts to legislation over a
subject inherently domestic in its nature and upon which the
existence of civilized society depends."
After upholding the state's right to legislate on the divorce
question in -general, about which there was no serious doubt,
the court proceeded to the real point of the case,-did Massachusetts, in violation of the constitution, fail to give "full
faith and credit" to the judicial act of South Dakota? The
court said not. "The statute is directed not against divorces
obtained in other states as to persons domiciled there, but
against the execution in Massachusetts of decrees of divorce
obtained in other states by persons who are domiciled in Massachusetts and who go into such other states with the purpose
of practising a fraud upon the laws of the state of their
domicil; that is to procure a divorce without obtaining a bona
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fide domicil in such other state." Whatever may have been
the purpose of the legislature in enacting this statute, or
whether a fraud was being practised on the state of Massachusetts, is immaterial in considering its constitutionality. If
the decree of South Dakota is such a decision as demands full
faith and credit under the constitution, clearly the Massachusetts statute is unconstitutional, although, as Justice White says,
the inevitable result of such a doctrine "would be the destruction of substantial legislative power over the subject of the dissolution of the marriage tie, for a man could, without acquiring
a bona fide domicil therein, obtain a divorce and compel the
state of the domicil to give full faith to the divorce thus fraudulently obtained. Since the Constitution of the United States
confers no power on the government to regulate marriake, it
would be that the governments, state and federal, are bereft
by the Constitution of the United States of a power which
must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government."
The gist of the numerous decisions on the interpretation
of the "full faith and credit" clause has been summarized
by Story in his "Constitutional Law:" "They intended to
give to them full faith and credit,--that is, to attribute to them
positive and absolute verity,-so that they cannot be contradicted or the truth of them denied, any more than in the state
where they originated. The evils of introducing a general
system of re-examination of the judicial proceedings of other
states, whose connections are so intimate and whose rights are
so interwoven with our own, would far outweigh any supposed
benefits from an imagined superior justice in a few cases."
Green v. Sarmiento, i Peters, Cir. Rep. 74 (i8io); Hitchcock v. Aiken, 1 Caines Rep. 462 (18o3) ; Commonwealth v.
Green, 17 Mass. 514 (1822).
On the other hand, to guard against fraudulent and unauthorized judicial acts of other states, the clause has been
uniformly interpreted to mean that full faith and credit are to
be given to a judicial act only when the court rendering such
decision has jurisdiction of the cause and parties and judgment
was obtained without fraud on the court. The law is clearly
stated by Justice Gray in the late case of Wisconsin v. Pelican
Insurance Co., 121 U. S. 265 (1888). "These provisions (re.ferring to the constitutional acts) establish a rule of evidence
rather than of jurisdiction. While they make the record of a
judgment rendered after due notice in one state, conclusive
evidence in the courts of another state, or of the United States,
of the matter adjudged, they do not affect the jurisdiction,
either of the court in which the judgment is rendered or of
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the court in which it is offered in evidence." Thompson v.
Whitman, 18 Wall, 457 (1874); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass.
462 (1812); Harris v. Hardemann, I4 How. 334 (1852);
Thorman v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350 (1899). See also the late
cases of Johnson v. Insurance Co., 187 U. S. 491 (1902);
Hale v. Allison, 188 U. S. 56 (19o2); Finney v. Guy, i89
U. S.335 (1902).
If, therefore, this statute is to be upheld, it must be upon
the ground that the court of South Dakota had no jurisdiction, and this in fact is the position of Andrews v. Andrews.
But did the South Dakota Court have'jurisdiction? Before
answering this question specifically it will be first necessary
to determine what the nature of a divorce proceeding is and
upon what, the jurisdiction in such cases depends. With the
exception of the courts of New York and the two Carolinas,
the states have held that a proceeding in divorce is one in rem,
and not in personam. It is immaterial, therefore, whether one
of the parties is out of the jurisdiction, and is reached only
by constructive service, for the state has the power to regulate
the status of the one residing therein. This doctrine is denied
in New York, where the courts contend that there can be no
proceeding in rem and that no court has power to grant by
constructive service, unless both parties are domiciled in the
state. Such is the decision in People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78
(1879); O'Dea v. O'Dea, ioi N. Y. 23 (1886); Williams v.
Williams, 13o N. Y. 193 (1891); Mc.Creery v. Davis, 44 S.
Car. 195 (1894); Irby v. Wilson, i Dev. and Bat. Eq. (N.
Car.) 568 (1837); and where the parties appear in a proceeding in another state, although that court has no jurisdiction according to the majority view, the decree has been dedared valid in New York. In Jones v. Jones, io8 N. Y. 415
(1888), where there was a proceeding in Texas in which the
defendant appeared, the court said, "The judgment of the
Texas court became and is a binding adjudication on the defendant therein for the reason that the defendant by going to
Texas and filing an answer to the action, became bound by
the statute law of the state prescribing the effect of that proceeding, and that by the Texas law the filing of an answer
by a defendant is an appearance and submission to the jurisdiction."
The' effect of this alarming doctrine was just what the
other courts sought to avoid, for it afforded the opportunity
to the parties to go outside their own state and by mere appearance, accompanied by nominal residence for the statutory period, obtain a divorce in defraud of their own state
laws. The New York courts have gone so far that they
have held a man guilty of bigamy where his wife obtained
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a divorce in another state upon constructive service upon the
defendant, People v. Baker, supra, though the court admitted
that the status of the party in the state where the divorce was
obtained may be adjudged by that state, but that it could not
affect the matrimonial relation of the defendant in another
state, apparently a refusal without an attempt at justification,
to give full faith and credit to decision of a sister state, which
it acknowledged was binding in the state where it was rendered.
It was this position of the New York courts, that jurisdiction depends upon the appearance of the parties, that was
urged in Andrews v. Andrews, and from the fact that the
parties appeared in the action it was contended that thereby
South Dakota gained jurisdiction and that Massachusetts was
bound to recognize the divorce; but the Supreme Court was
committed to the position that a decree of divorce was a
judgment in rem, and the acceptance of such a doctrine would
in effect cause the overruling of the late case of Atherton v.
Atherton, I81 U. S. 155 (Igoo), and a repudiation of the
principles in Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (19oo), and Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, T81 U. S. 179 (19oo).
In Atherton v. Atherton the facts were these: A was a
resident of Kentucky and had always lived there. He married B in New York and took her to Kentucky, where they
resided together until 1891, when the wife went back to New
York. A obtained a divorce, process being served on the
wife by mailing it to her address in pursuance of the laws of
Kentucky. In New York the wife began an action for a
limited divorce and the question then arose as to the validity
of the Kentucky divorce. The New York Court, following
their former decisions, held that the divorce was not binding
in New York. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
reversing this decision, held that the domicil being in Kentucky the courts of that state had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the decree was entitled to full faith and credit
although the wife was only constructively served. In the same
year came the decisions in Bell v. Bell and Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, supra, leaving no doubt as to a divorce being a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction a question of domicil, as far as
the United States Supreme Court was concerned.
It must be remembered, however, that domicil is not mere
residence. "There is a broad distinction between a legal and
an actual residence. A legal residence (domicil) cannot in
the nature of things co-exist in the same person in two states
or countries. . . . His legal residence consists of fact and intention; both must concur, and when his legal residence is
once fixed, it requires both fact and intention to change it."
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Tipton v. Tipton, 87 Ky. 243 (1888). While the various state
divorce statutes speak of residence, the Supreme Court of the
United States and the state courts interpret residence to mean
both domicil and residence. People v. Smith, 13 Hun. (N.
Y-) 414 (1878) ; Bell v. Bell, supra; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,
supra; Tipton v. Tipton, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, 5 Prob.
Div. 163 -(Eng.), (1879); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 35 N. H.
474 (1857).
"No mere pretence of residence, no passing visit, no temporary presence, no assumption of residence here pro hac vice
only, nothing short of actual abode here, with intention of
perianent residence, will fill the letter or the spirit of the
statute." Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651 (1876). Precisely the state of facts before the court in Andrews v. Andrews, uniformly held not sufficient by the state courts; Neff
v. Beauchamp, 74 Iowa, 92 (1887); Way v. Way, 64 Ill. 406
(1872); Smith v. Smith, 75 N. W. R. (N. D.) 783 (1898)_;
Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 46 Iowa, 437 (1877); Gregory v.
Gregory, 76 Me. 535 (1884), under statute similar to that of
Massachusetts; Commonwealth v. Ainsworth, 6 Pa. Dis. Rep.
707 (1897) ; Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 589 (1896) ; Brown
v. Brown, 14 N. J. Eq. 78 (1861). The English law is in
accord with thisposition. Shaw v. Gould, L. R. 3 H. L. 55
(1868). In other words, irrespective of the Massachusetts
statute, this divorce was not entitled to recognition. The
legislature simply codified the decisions of its own and the
other state courts.
Although Andrews v. Andrews finally settle; the law in
some respects, there is still much need of remedial legislation.
As the law now stands, it is in the power of one court to
declare "Dakota divorces" void as without jurisdiction, and
should the matter subsequently arise in another state, which
case is not beyond probability, the same question confronts
the court, is it bound to give full faith and credit to the state
of original jurisdiction or must it recognize the later decision
declaring it void, or must it inquire into the jurisdiction itself ?
The problem is still difficult and, as is the opinion of eminent jurists, one which can only be solved by either amending
the constitution or having the legislatures of the various states
concur in identical divorce laws, an ideal situation yet to be
accomplished in American history.
M.B.S.

